Technology 101

The proliferation in local police departments’ use of surveillance technology, which in most places has occurred without any community input or control, presents significant threats to civil rights and civil liberties that disproportionately impact communities of color and low-income communities. The nationwide “Community Control Over Police Surveillance” effort is looking to change that through legislation mandating that local communities are given a meaningful opportunity to review and participate in all decisions about if and how surveillance technologies are acquired and used locally.

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  • Electronic toll readers, such as E-ZPass, use radio-frequency identification (RFID) to allow for the collection of tolls using a transponder placed inside a car. They also allow for the monitoring of traffic patterns. Although the devices are sold as toll-payment devices, they are frequently used for non-toll purposes without the badge holder's knowledge or permission.

    The data captured by electronic toll readers can be stored for an extended period of time and used to create a record of where people travel. The transponders can be read and cars identified in any location there is a RFID receiver, not just at toll booths, which enables the government to develop detailed tracking databases.

  • CCTV cameras are video cameras that transmit their signal to a limited number of external monitors or computers. They are frequently used by the police to monitor communities remotely. CCTV is also widely used by private entities for security and monitoring purposes.

    Despite proof that they are ineffective in reducing crime, CCTV cameras remain over-deployed in areas that are deemed by police to be “high crime,” often code for communities of color and low-income communities. CCTV allows the police to monitor residents around the clock in public locations. In communities that are already over-policed, being under the constant, watchful eye of the police greatly increases the risk of having an adverse encounter with the police for every member of the public.

    In FY 2020-2021, MPD spent almost $850k on modernizing its CCTV network, replacing 53 cameras. The document also says that this will include $1M in future appropriations (See 2020 Performance Oversight Hearing of the Metropolitan Police Department questions)

    In D.C., the Office of Victim Services and Justice Grants operates a rebate program that incentivizes D.C. residents to purchase private surveillance cameras and share footage with or grant access to D.C. Police.

    MPD: Number of CCTV in Washington, D.C.

    DCist: D.C. Pays Residents To Install Home Security Cameras. There’s A Clear Divide In Which Neighborhoods Take Part (MAR 9, 2020)

  • Gunshot detectors, like ShotSpotter, are essentially microphones that are designed to detect the sound of a gunshot. By placing them throughout an area, the microphones are able to triangulate a gunshot and provide police with a limited geographic location from which a gunshot emanated.

    While gunshot detectors have a useful law enforcement application, concerns arise from what the devices actually are: microphones that can be used to listen in on a community remotely. If limited solely to detecting and reporting on the locations of gunshots, the devices are not problematic. However, if these secretly operated microphones can be remotely activated and used to listen in on the communities in which they are placed, they can represent another form of general mass surveillance. Only with strict limitations and auditing can we be sure this technology is not abused, and such oversight commonly does not exist.

    MacArthur Justice Center “reviewed ShotSpotter deployments for roughly 21 months (from July 1, 2019, through April 14, 2021) using data obtained from the City of Chicago, found that 89% of ShotSpotter’s reports led police to find no gun-related crime and 86% turned up no crime at all, amounting to about 40,000 dead-end ShotSpotter deployments.” See report.


    D.C. Police publish ShotSpotter data through its Open Gov DC portal.

    Washington Post: How ShotSpotter locates gunfire, helps police catch shooters and works to ‘denormalize’ gun violence (5/10/2017)

    DCist: A Look at Where, When, and How Gunfire is Detected D.C. (10/12/2017)

    Metropolitan Police Department: ShotSpotter Data, Disclaimer and Dictionary

    Open Data DC: ShotSputter Gun Shots

    Surveillance Technology Oversight Project: ShotSpotter and the Misfires of Gunshot Detection Technology (July 14, 2022)

  • This software can be used to covertly monitor, collect, and analyze individuals’ social media data from platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. It can identify social media posts and users based on specific keywords; geographically track people as they communicate; chart people’s relationships, networks, and associations; monitor protests; identify the leaders of political and social movements; and measure a person’s influence.

    The technology is also promoted as a predictor of future events, including threat assessment.

    Instead of relying on criminal activity to prompt investigations, SMMS is used to cast nets so wide it encompasses the entire internet, sweeping in scores of innocent people. Moreover, the technology has been used to disproportionately target persons of color, including Black Lives Matter activists. As the public grows increasingly aware of the government’s monitoring of social media, SMMS has the potential to drastically discourage free speech on the internet.

    DCist: Lawsuit Accuses D.C. of Withholding Public Records On Police Social Media Surveillance (March 2, 2022)

    Brennan Center: Third-Party Vendors of Social Media Monitoring Tools for Law Enforcement Agencies (December 21, 2021)

  • This wearable video and audio recording technology captures police interactions with the public from an angle approximating a police officer’s point of view. Device functionality, operations, and reliability can vary significantly based on the manufacturer and operating software.

    According to a February 2015 news report, the most popular seller of police body cameras and related services, Taser, offered the City of San Diego a five-year contract that included the purchase of 1,000 cameras for $267,000 and another $3,600,000 for data storage contracts, software licenses, maintenance, warranties, and related equipment. This figure does not include internal operations cost, which are significant.

    While wearable cameras have the potential to promote officer/public safety and provide greater police transparency and accountability, they can also present a significant threat to privacy. The utility of these devices is largely determined by the policies that govern their operations. With the wrong policies in place, body cameras can be turned from a transparency and accountability tool into a police propaganda and mass surveillance tool.

    Submit a Request from MPD for body worn cameras here.

  • Predictive policing software uses mathematical and analytical techniques to attempt to predict future criminal activity, offenders, and victims.

    The predictive policing model is deceptive and problematic. Inputting historically biased data into a computer and then running it through an algorithm produces biased results that will merely continue the trend of over-policing communities of color and low-income communities. This highly untested technology raises additional questions, such as how accurate the algorithms are that extract information from the data. These tools are often proprietary, with their algorithms, data inputs, and source code being shielded from public review and oversight.

    Data-driven policing can also incorporate unreliable or false information, including into secretive gang databases. In June [2021], leaked documents revealed that the Washington, D.C., gang database is also riddled with inaccurate data, including on children younger than six years old, and gangs made up by the police based on intersections or geographical landmarks. (See Data-driven policing’s threat to our constitutional rights)

    In FY18, MPD paid $51,613.50 for a software license renewal for the IBM's i2 Analyst Workstation, which "integrate[s] data analysis with intelligence-led policing to uncover hidden connections and criminal networks to thwart crime."

    Previous reporting found that MPD may have used Palantir in the past:

    Washington City Paper: D.C. Police Sought a Contract With Palantir, But it Never Materialized (5/10/2018)

    Wired: How Peter Thiel's Secretive Data Company Pushed into Policing (8/9/2017)

    DCInno: Former DC Mayor Fenty Reveals DC PD Were Clients of Secretive Software Firm (7/12/2015)

  • “Smart Cities” hold the promise of city landscapes fully connected to the internet. Sensors and cameras can monitor pedestrian traffic on sidewalks, public transit ridership, when a garbage can is full, or when a streetlight goes out. In theory, this would make for a more efficient city, but it could be sacrificing residents’ privacy in the process.

    D.C. has deployed at least two “Smart City” technologies. Mobility Data Specification (MDS) software tracks the movement and location of vehicles as they travel. Currently used for dockless vehicles like electric bikes and scooters, the MDS provides real-time location data for each rider’s trip, including where and when it was picked up and dropped off, and the route the rider took in between. In March 2020, the COS-DC coalition sent a letter to the D.C. Department of Transportation (DDOT) expressing its concern that the government’s collection of such granular real-time GPS data was a violation of privacy. In Fall 2020, the D.C. Council passed legislation that allowed for collection of GPS data, but not in real time.

    COS-DC Letter to Mayor Bowser and DDOT (3/26/2020)

    Electric Mobility Devices Amendment Act of 2019 (aka "Shared Fleet Devices Amendment Act of 2020" (passed 10/20/2020)

    In 2017, the District launched “D.C. Smart Street Lighting,” a project to replace existing streetlights with new LED lights that are more energy efficient and outfitted with Wi-Fi. However, LED can actually conceal tiny cameras and microphones that can stealthily monitor their surroundings and transmit their feeds back to a central monitoring station. The coalition raised surveillance concerns during a community meeting in December 2018 and was assured the streetlights will not have cameras or microphones. However as of July 2020, there were no rules governing the streetlight rollout.

    Fox5: Smart street light plan in District prompting privacy worries (12/13/2018)

    D.C. OP3 Project Profile: DC Smart Street Lighting

    ACLU.org: How to Stop Smart Cities from Becoming Surveillance Cities (9/17/2018)

  • These tools allow law enforcement officials or other government actors to gain access to a person’s personal computing equipment (including laptops and cell phones) and password-protected websites or accounts (like cloud storage or social media accounts). They can enable hacking to be performed in person and remotely without the permission of the account holder or service operator.

    “Hacking” technology is surveillance because a government that hacks into a private computer or account intends to surveil the private contents of the hacked computer or account without the owner’s permission or knowledge. Using hacking software or hardware is like picking a lock to break into someone’s house — the act is an integral part of the unlawful entering.

    Most hacking tools depend on vulnerabilities in commonly used computer software and services. When our government and police use hacking tools, which exploit these vulnerabilities rather than addressing them, they not only leave the systems open to their own intrusions but also to intrusions by hackers, criminals, and foreign governments.

  • These flying cameras provide live video feed from the drone’s camera directly to police headquarters. These drones were originally remote-controlled by police, but some now have self-flying technology and can track vehicles and people automatically. This technology could be used to inspect buildings, cars, and ultimately target specific communities or people.

    In June 2012, Drone Watch filed a FOIA request with the MPD regarding the possession and/or use of drones by the Department. In August 2012, the MPD answered: “The FOIA Office has been advised that the Metropolitan Police Department does not have or use drones. “In a 2020 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services report stated that “The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington, D.C., does not currently have a drone program but is considering future implementation. “The MPD participates in a citywide UAS [Unmanned Aircraft System] working group that was established by the mayor to look at potential drone usage not only for law enforcement but also for the fire department and other government agencies like the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs,” said Assistant Chief Jeffery Carroll of the MPD.”

  • The emergence of contact tracing apps to slow the spread of COVID-19 throughout the country led city leaders to commission the development of mobile phone apps to track exposure. The app would use location data and notify users if they had been in proximity to someone who tested positive for the coronavirus. Early reports suggested real-time location tracking via GPS would be used for tracking (as it does in Korea). The COS-DC coalition sent a letter to the mayor and Department of Health outlining its privacy concerns. The DC CAN COVID app does not use GPS and is fully anonymous and voluntary.

    COS-DC Letter to Mayor Bowser and D.C. Council (6/2/2020)

    DC CAN Privacy Policy

    Washington City Paper: Washington City Paper: Here Is What We Know About Contact Tracing Security And Your Privacy (7/16/2020)